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first be satisfied, at stage one. that
there is good reason to extend
time ... If he is not so satisfied,
that is the end of the application
and stage two will never arise. If
he is so satisfied, then he must go
on., at stage two, to a general exer-
cise of a discretion involving a
consideration of all the circum-
stances including the balance of
prejudice or hardship.
Therefore, confirmed by Baly v Barrett
(HL) [1988] Nl 368, it was an error in
law to treat a factor like balance of
hardship as relevant to the question of
whether good reason for extension had
been shown, since its relevance only
arose in stage two.
When it comes to deciding what
matters are relevant at stage one and at
stage two, the judge applies a general
discretion. Both Liu JA and Nazareth
V-P agreed that matters relevant at
stage two were not necessarily irrel-
evant at stage one. There was a degree
of overlap. For that reason, the justice
of the Defendants' case was to be taken,
into account not only in the exercise of
discretion at stage two but the identifi-
cation, of good reason at stage one. But
in the specific instance of the present
case, justice certainly would not help to
transform that which was clearly.not
good reason into that which was:
 t-,;>••: '
' ' . • - . • • . ; ' : ; • . •.-•l;;.V;.C
The Court of Appeal unanimously ac-;.
cepted the principle of. ex tending the
validity of the writ to be that .good
reason, for the extension was of definite
essence before the Court could exercise
its discretion. Balance of hardship, or
sympathy was irrelevant to show a
good reason. . . , . . : . '
John R Edwards
Partner:
Koo & Partners:
Equitable fiduciary duty of employee - common law duty of
fidelity of employee - causation - burden of proof
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Kishimoto Sangyo Co '
Limited '"' ':
Kishimoto Sangyo (HK) Co•
Limited ,
v • . :
Akihiro Oba - • ' . ' ;
Leung Hin Yan, Bernett:
BOB Technology Limited
The fiduciary principle is rarely visited
by the Hong Kong:Court of Appeal.
Kishimoto Sangyo Co Ltd v Oba is an
exception, but unfortunately the deci-
sion is chiefly notable for its inadequa-
cies in analysing the relevant law.
The Plaintiffs brought an action
against Mr Akihiro Oba, the former
managing director of its Hong Kong
office, for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of the duty of fidelity
implied in the employment contract.
In the year before his resignation,
Mr Oba was principally responsible
for a project whereby Kishimoto acted
as the 'middleman'^ in arranging the
supply of LCD! manufacturing equip-
ment from Japan to; a Taiwanese com-
pany, Prime View, for the production
of LCD displays. . v .•;;.;
Prime View intended to install a
pilot plant to test the viability of mass
production of LCD displays. By April
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1993, Mr Oba reported to Kishimoto
that Prime View planned to visit Japan
in June 1993 to investigate mass pro-
duction, in 1995 and had requested that
Kishimoto accompany it.
Soon after two contracts were made
for the installation of the pilot plant,
Prime View indicated that it looked
forward to Kishimoto's continued full
support. At this critical moment,
Kishimoto decided that the project
should be handled by its Taiwanese
rather than Hong Kong subsidiary. Mr
Oba was displeased with this decision
and on 7 July 1993 gave notice to re-
sign, to take effect on 31 October 1993.
In September 1993, before his resig-
nation took effect, Mr Oba acquired
BOIS, the third Defendant, with a view
to competing with Kishimoto once he
resigned. Meanwhile, he lied to
Kishimoto that he intended to go into
the antique business.
In December 1993, he
tacting Prime View to promote BOIS.
By January .1995, Mr Oba, on BOIS's
behalf, was on the; verge of finalising a;'
contract with Prime
• who- • formerly ;
operation of these suppliers. Kishimoto immediately issued, a-
Oba and BOIS.y; : ; "
Breach of Fiduciary Duty .
Kishimoto argued
for Mr Oba's '
breaches of .
to Ms
-good
number of contract for the Prime View
production' project.
: . 'Applying Canadian Aero Services v
O'Malley (1973)40 DLR(3d) 371, the trial judge, '
Oba was in breach of his fiduciary duty
by diverting Kishimoto's maturing
business opportunity in the mass pro-
duction project.
The Court of Appeal took the rare
step of departing from the trial judge's
finding of fact and held that when Mr
Oba resigned in October 1993, Kishimoto
did not have a maturing business op-
portunity.
According to Litton VP, the produc-
tion project was at best prospective and
embryonic for two reasons: Firstly, the
pilot plant was not set up until Decem-
ber 1993, and even if it had been and
Prime View had gone ahead with mass
production, there was no certainty that
Kishimoto would have obtained the rel-
evant contracts; secondly, the suppliers
were wooed over because Mr Oba of-
fered better services than could
Kshimoto without Mr Oba's expertise.
-'•'••'.. 'With. .respect/neither of those two
reasons stand u p against existing a u - t h o r i t y . T h e first reason . - Kishimoto's
f a i l u r e t o show a certainty that i t w o u l d / o b t a i n t h e mass production contracts -
:: is inconsistent with the fact that the court
;is drily asked to protect an opportunity.
"'., The second reason - that the prospective
;. business partner preferred the fiduciary
: to his principal- has not been a relevant
consideration in past decisions. In fact, it
is' often the hallmark of decisions where
the fiduciaries are held liable.
V/}' ."•; Although the opportunity in Cana-
Ltd v O' Malley was a
De-
Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972]
Roskill J : considered it
;tiffobtaining the contract was no greater
Green & Clara Pty Ltd v Bestobell
-ttd;[1982] WAR 1, 'the
fiduciary obtained the contract by offer-
Vijtgthe lowest tender, but the Plaintiff's
f tender being the third lowest it could not
have Obtained the contract anyway.
Si:}In Markwell Brothers Ltd v Diesel[1983]
;2 Qd R 508, the Plaintiff employer only
had an 'outside chance'of maintaining a
• franchise, but nonetheless succeeded in
suing for diversion of the franchise.
>;;/.'Of course, the courts have not pro-
tected all business opportunities, They
have refused to protect the mere hope of
a customer making repeat orders after a
first order (Island Export Finance Ltd v
Unumma (1986) BCLC 460). Nor have
they protected a 'global opportunity' on
the part of a manufacturer and seller of
glass fibre tubes to sell to potential buy-
ers in the market (Balston Ltd v Headlines
Filters [1987] FSR 33).
The opportunity must also be ac-
tively pursued. Hence, in Peso Silver
Mines Ltd v Cropper[l966\ SCR 673, it
was not held to be a breach of fiduciary
duty for company directors to take up
an order that the board had decided
not to pursue.
The principle that emerges from these
cases is that the more specific and devel-
oped the opportunity, the more likely it
would be held to be a maturing business
opportunity. The reason is simple. When
a company has successfully developed a
specific business opportunity: with a
potential customer, it enjoys a headstart
over other competitors in the market.
This makes it particularly tempting for a
fiduciary, who has encyclopaedic knowl-
edge of the opportunity and personal
contact with the customer, to usurp the ,
opportunity for his or her own:benefit. It
is precisely against such conflicts' of in-
terest that fiduciary law protects.
Hence, while a fiduciary
divert specific ^
actively: pursued by its principal. it
remains free to compete fairly by de-.
veloping own initiative, general business/
,
 ;by • .
. said for" .
ness ppportunity.' .. A ' pilot project
scheme' ra
•.a
mass
to Japan enjoyed;
}}/}.
The Court of Appeal further held that
the Plaintiffs failed to establish causa-
tion between the alleged breaches and
the loss suffered. This was because it
held that Kishimoto's failure to obla'ixp
the mass production contracts was due*
to the loss of Mr Oba's expertise, rather
than alleged breaches of Ms fiduciary
duty. • — ' ' ^ }}}r.i:/»};}y
Because of the split trial, the issa^ of
causation was not argued at first
stance. Neither was it fully argued be-
fore the Court of Appeal. Had:it been,
the Court of Appeal might have been
advised that the test
breach of the equitable ;
was not as strict as that at common law
for breach -of contract or tort.:/"}r}}}';}i}s:p
/'}. i}Where breach fo fiduciary duty is alleged, a long line of
cates that the onus
unclear fromo deci-
has shown that suffi-
to the former category.
have been, able to take advantage of the
lower burden of proof. If this had been
the case, it would have been more diffi-
cult for the Court to dismiss the causa-
tion issue on the ground that the absence
of Mr Oba's expertise was the cause of
the Plaintiffs' loss.
Even if the absence of Mr Oba's ex-
pertise from Kishimoto was the most
proximate cause of its loss, Kishimoto
should have succeeded by showing that
the breach was a cause of the loss. The
burden should have shifted to the
Defendant to prove that Prime View
would not have contracted with
Kishimoto even if Mr Oba had not pro-
vided an alternative in competition with
his former employer.
Alternatively, as loss of chance is a
well-recognised item of loss in claims
for breach of fiduciary duty, Kishimoto
could have argued that had it not been
for Mr Oba's competition in breach,
Kishimoto would at least have had a
chance of obtaining the contract that Mr
Oba was about to sign with Prime View.
Because of the split trial, however, the
evidence necessary for determining
whether such a chance existed, was not
led. The most appropriate course might
have been to have remitted the matter to
the High Court for further hearing on
the issue of causation.
of Dyfy of Fidelity
The Court of Appeal held that Mr Oba,
by acquiring BOB during the period of
his employment wi th a view to compet-
ing with Kishimoto (and lying about his
future intention), had breached his im-
plied common law duty to act in good
faith towards his employer.
This finding in Kishimoto is in con-
trast with a strong line of recent
authority for the proposition that by
secretly carrying out preparatory acts to
set up a business in competition with their employers, employees do not
breach their duty to their employers :
(Balston v Headline Ltd). :; : '•"'••'.'••^
The decision in Kishimoto also:sits;:
uncomfortably with the Court's ruling;
that, on the same facts, there was no^
breach of fiduciary duty. It-is bemusing'
that the common law duty of fidelity
forbids a resigning manager from
secretly preparing for his future^ white-
the equitable fiduciary-duty -of loyalty;
justifies this as his entitlement to<
'cultivate his own commercial relation-:
ships ... without attracting the disap-;
proval of equity'. • - • ; ; • • ' ; . " - . ; • ' ; ; . ; .
Admiralty law - whether counterclaims caught as 'actions'
under section 8 of Maritime Conventions Act - discretion of
court to extend time limit under s 8
Hon Nazareth, V-P, Godfrey JA and Seagroatt J • Judgment dated 12 July 1996
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- Faculty of Law
University of Hong Kong)
The Owners of the Ship or.•:• *
Vessel 'Kafur Mamedov'
V - . - , . • . : • - . .
The Owners and /or Demise
Charterers of the Ship or ;
Vessel 'Goldpath' and Others,
The Court's strict observance of time
limits for the bringing of proceedings
often causes grief to plaintiffs but relief
to defendants.
In a recent case before the Hong
Kong Court of Appeal involving a col-
lision between the vessels Kafur
Mamedov and Goldpath, however, it was
the Defendants (Appellants) which
sought an extension
 :of the two-year
time limit for the bringing of a 'coun-
terclaim' under s 8 of the Maritime
Conventions Act 1911 (the Act).
The Facts
On 23 August 1993 the Kafur Mamedov
and the Goldpath collided inHongKong
waters. On 22 August 1995 (the last
Hong Kong Lawyer November 1996
day before the claim would have been
time-barred) the owners of the Kafur
Mamedov (the Respondents) com-
menced proceedings against the own-
ers of the Goldpath (Appellants). In De-
cember 1993 the Appellants filed no-
tice of a counterclaim to the Respond-
ents' claim even though the Respond-
ents were yet to file and serve their
statement of claim. The Appellants then
issued two motions for extensions of
time under s 8 of the Act which pro-
vides that'.. .no action shall be main-
tainable to enforce any claim... unless
proceedings therein are commenced
within 2 years .. /
Section. 8 also provides the Court
with a general, jurisdiction, to extend
the time -limits 'for
ings and
tend time
ble- to arrest
during;th,e 2-year. period.;
opinion.: that
ceded -that -s. -8 of;t
Defendants ' issuing'
the same: way:
tiffs issuing
issu
'"action" with s; 8 pi .the
canvassed -at first instance;.
some, strictness.
